But what a foray. Like the whole universe, your consciousness popped into existence out of nothingness and has evolved into a rich and complex entity full of wonder and mystery.

然而這個(gè)打擾卻不簡單。你的意識就像宇宙那樣，一下就從虛無之中蹦了出來，并且最終發(fā)展成為一個(gè)豐富多彩而又復(fù)雜萬分的實(shí)體，其中滿是神奇與神秘。

Contemplating this leads to a host of mind-boggling questions. What are the odds of my consciousness existing at all? How can such a thing emerge from nothingness? Is there any possibility of it surviving my death? And what is consciousness anyway?

如此這般追索下去，就會(huì)引出一個(gè)令人糾結(jié)不安的問題：我的意識得以存在的幾率究竟如何？怎么可能于虛無之中而生出？我死之后它還能否繼續(xù)存在？而意識又究竟是什么？

Answering these questions is incredibly difficult. Philosopher Thomas Nagel once asked, "What is it like to be a bat?" Your response might be to imagine flying around in the dark, seeing the world in the echoes of high-frequency sounds. But that isn't the answer Nagel was looking for. He wanted to emphasise that there is no way of knowing what it is like for a bat to feel like a bat. That, in essence, is the conundrum of consciousness.

要回答諸如此類的問題，那是超乎想象地困難。哲人托馬斯·內(nèi)格爾（Thomas Nagel）曾有問曰：“做只蝙蝠的感受是怎樣的？”對此，你的反應(yīng)也許是想到：能在黑暗之中自由飛翔，籍由高頻音波反射看清世界，如此等等。然而，這些并非托馬斯·內(nèi)格爾所要追尋的答案，他真正想說的是：根本沒有辦法得知什么樣的感受才是一只蝙蝠的感受。而這才是意識之謎的實(shí)質(zhì)所在。

Neuroscientists and philosophers fall into two broad camps. One thinks that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain and that once we fully understand the intricate workings of neuronal activity, consciousness will be laid bare. The other doubts it will be that simple. They agree that consciousness emerges from the brain, but argue that Nagel's question will always remain unanswered: knowing every detail of a bat's brain cannot tell us what it is like to be a bat. This is often called the "hard problem" of consciousness, and seems scientifically intractable - for now.

就此謎題，神經(jīng)學(xué)家與哲學(xué)家形成了兩大陣營。一方認(rèn)為：意識乃是大腦的一種自然屬性；一旦我們充分認(rèn)識了神經(jīng)活動(dòng)的復(fù)雜機(jī)理，意識之謎就會(huì)大白于天下。而另一方則認(rèn)為：事情沒有這么簡單；他們也承認(rèn)意識發(fā)生于大腦，但卻也指出：內(nèi)格爾之問將永無答案，因?yàn)榫退阃笍亓私饬蓑鸫竽X的一切的一切，卻仍然無從得知蝙蝠的感受究竟如何。此即經(jīng)常所謂之意識“難題”，而且似乎難以科學(xué)地予以解釋，至少現(xiàn)在還不行。

Meanwhile, "there are way too many so-called easy problems to worry about", says Anil Seth of the University of Sussex in Brighton, UK.

而另一方面，“我們有很多辦法去探究那些所謂簡單的問題”，英國布萊頓薩塞克斯大學(xué)（University of Sussex in Brighton, UK）的Anil Seth如是說。

One is to look for signatures of consciousness in brain activity, in the hope that this takes us closer to understanding what it is. Various brain areas have been found to be active when we are conscious of something and quiet when we are not. For example, Stanislas Dehaene of the French National Institute of Health and Medical Research in Gif sur Yvette and colleagues have identified such regions in our frontal and parietal lobes (Nature Neuroscience, vol 8, p 1391).

辦法之一是在大腦活動(dòng)中尋找意識的印記，以期更深入了解它到底是什么。人們已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)，我們意識到的事物不同，大腦的活動(dòng)區(qū)域也不同，一些會(huì)很活躍，另一些則表現(xiàn)安靜。例如，坐落在吉夫續(xù)爾伊凡特（Gif sur Yvette）的法國國家健康與醫(yī)療研究所（French National Institute of Health and Medical Research）的Stanislas Dehaene及其同事，就已經(jīng)確認(rèn)了我們大腦額葉和頂葉中的這樣一些區(qū)域（Nature Neuroscience, vol 8, p 1391）。

Consciousness explained

對意識的一種解釋

This is consistent with a theory of consciousness proposed by Bernard Baars of the Neuroscience Institute in San Diego, California. He posited that most non-conscious experiences are processed in specialised local regions of the brain such as the visual cortex. We only become conscious of this activity when the information is broadcast to a network of neurons called the global workspace - perhaps the regions pinpointed by Dehaene.

這個(gè)解釋與加州圣地亞哥神經(jīng)科學(xué)院（Neuroscience Institute）Bernard Baars提出的意識理論相一致，他認(rèn)為：非意識體驗(yàn)大多均由大腦特定部位處理，例如視覺皮質(zhì)等等。只有相關(guān)信息傳播到稱之為全局平臺的神經(jīng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)，我們才會(huì)意識到這一活動(dòng)。這個(gè)平臺也許就是Dehaene所確定的那些區(qū)域。

But others believe the theory is not telling the whole story. "Does global workspace theory really explain consciousness, or just the ability to report about consciousness?" asks Seth.

但是也有人認(rèn)為，這一理論并不全面。Seth就質(zhì)疑道：“全局平臺說真的是在解釋意識，還是僅在解釋報(bào)告意識活動(dòng)的能力？”

Even so, the idea that consciousness seems to be an emergent property of the brain can take us somewhere. For example, it makes the odds of your own consciousness existing the same as the odds of you being born at all, which is to say, very small. Just think of that next time you suffer angst about your impending return to nothingness.

即便如此，意識似乎是大腦的自然屬性這一認(rèn)識也能對我們有所啟示。例如，這一認(rèn)識就意味著你自己的意識得以存在的幾率與你得以誕生的幾率并無二致，也就是說，這種幾率非常之小。設(shè)想一下你再次意識到自己終將回歸虛無時(shí)而要飽受的內(nèi)心煎熬吧。

As for whether individual consciousness can continue after death, "it is extremely unlikely that there would be any form of self-consciousness after the physical brain decays", says philosopher Thomas Metzinger of the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, Germany.

至于個(gè)人的意識死后能否繼續(xù)存在下去，美因茨大學(xué)（Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz）的哲學(xué)家Thomas Metzinger認(rèn)為：“物質(zhì)大腦死亡衰敗之后是否還有任何形式的意識存在，這種可能性極其之小?！?/span>

Extremely unlikely, but not impossible. Giuilio Tononi of the University of Wisconsin-Madison argues that consciousness is the outcome of how complex matter, including the brain, integrates information. "According to Tononi's theory, if one could build a device or a system that integrated information exactly the same way as a living brain, it would generate the same conscious experiences," says Seth. Such a machine might allow your consciousness to survive death. But it would still not know what it is like to be a bat.

極其之小，但并非不可能。威斯康星大學(xué)麥迪遜分校（University of Wisconsin-Madison）的Giuilio Tononi指出：意識乃是復(fù)雜事物——包括大腦本身——如何與信息整合的產(chǎn)物。Seth說：“按照Tononi的理論，如果能夠造出某種與活腦完全一樣整合信息的裝置或者系統(tǒng)，它就應(yīng)當(dāng)能夠產(chǎn)生同樣的意識體驗(yàn)?！边@樣的機(jī)器也許就能讓你的意識逃脫死亡。然而，它依然還是無法知道一只蝙蝠的感受到底是什么。