斯坦福哲學百科全書 Buddha佛

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy斯坦福哲學百科全書

Buddha佛

First published Thu Feb 17, 2011; substantive revision Thu Feb 14, 2019

The Buddha (fl. circa 450 BCE) is the individual whose teachings form the basis of the Buddhist tradition. These teachings, preserved in texts known as the Nikāyas or āgamas, concern the quest for liberation from suffering. While the ultimate aim of the Buddha’s teachings is thus to help individuals attain the good life, his analysis of the source of suffering centrally involves claims concerning the nature of persons, as well as how we acquire knowledge about the world and our place in it. These teachings formed the basis of a philosophical tradition that developed and defended a variety of sophisticated theories in metaphysics and epistemology. 首次發(fā)布于2011年2月17日：實質(zhì)性修訂 2019年2月14日

佛陀（大約公元前450年）是其教義構(gòu)成佛教傳統(tǒng)基礎(chǔ)的個人。這些教義保存在被稱為"尼基亞人"或"伽瑪斯"的課文中，涉及尋求從苦難中解放出來。雖然佛陀教義的最終目的是幫助個人獲得美好生活，但他對痛苦根源的分析主要涉及關(guān)于人的性質(zhì)，以及我們?nèi)绾潍@得關(guān)于世界和我們在其中的地位的知識的主張。這些教義構(gòu)成了哲學傳統(tǒng)的基礎(chǔ)，這種傳統(tǒng)發(fā)展并捍衛(wèi)了形而上學和認識論中各種復雜的理論。

1. Buddha as Philosopher佛陀為哲學家

This entry concerns the historical individual, traditionally called Gautama, who is identified by modern scholars as the founder of Buddhism. According to Buddhist teachings, there have been other Buddhas in the past, and there will be yet more in the future. The title 'Buddha’, which literally means 'awakened’, is conferred on an individual who discovers the path to nirvana, the cessation of suffering, and propagates that discovery so that others may also achieve nirvana. If the teaching that there have been other Buddhas is true, then Gautama is not the founder of Buddhism. This entry will follow modern scholarship in taking an agnostic stance on the question of whether there have been other Buddhas, and likewise for questions concerning the superhuman status and powers that some Buddhists attribute to Buddhas. The concern of this entry is just those aspects of the thought of the historical individual Gautama that bear on the development of the Buddhist philosophical tradition.

這個條目涉及歷史人物，傳統(tǒng)上被稱為高塔瑪，誰被現(xiàn)代學者確定為佛教的創(chuàng)始人。根據(jù)佛教的教導，過去還有其他佛陀，將來還會有更多佛像。標題"佛陀"，字面意思是"覺醒"，授予一個人誰發(fā)現(xiàn)涅磐的道路，停止痛苦，并傳播這一發(fā)現(xiàn)，使其他人也可以實現(xiàn)涅磐。如果說有其他佛陀的教導是真的，那么高塔瑪就不是佛教的創(chuàng)始人了。這一條目將遵循現(xiàn)代學術(shù)，在是否有其他佛陀的問題上采取不可知論的立場，同樣，對于一些佛教徒將佛陀歸因于超人地位和權(quán)力的問題。這個條目的關(guān)注點只是歷史個體高塔瑪思想的那些方面，它承載著佛教哲學傳統(tǒng)的發(fā)展。

The Buddha will here be treated as a philosopher. To so treat him is controversial, but before coming to why that should be so, let us first rehearse those basic aspects of the Buddha’s life and teachings that are relatively non-controversial. Tradition has it that Gautama lived to age 80. Up until recently his dates were thought to be approximately 560–480 BCE, but many scholars now hold that he must have died around 405 BCE. He was born into a family of some wealth and power, members of the ?ākya clan, in the area of the present border between India and Nepal. The story is that in early adulthood he abandoned his comfortable life as a householder (as well as his wife and young son) in order to seek a solution to the problem of existential suffering. He first took up with a number of different wandering ascetics (?ramanas) who claimed to know the path to liberation from suffering. Finding their teachings unsatisfactory, he struck out on his own, and through a combination of insight and meditational practice attained the state of enlightenment (bodhi) which is said to represent the cessation of all further suffering. He then devoted the remaining 45 years of his life to teaching others the insights and techniques that had led him to this achievement.佛陀將在這里被視為哲學家。這樣對待他是有爭議的，但在來為什么應該這樣之前，讓我們先排練一下佛陀生活的基本方面和相對沒有爭議的教義。傳統(tǒng)認為高塔瑪活到80歲。直到最近，他的約會日期被認為是大約公元前560-480年，但許多學者現(xiàn)在認為，他一定是在公元前405年左右去世的。他出生在一個擁有一定財富和權(quán)力的家庭，是奧基亞家族的成員，目前位于印度和尼泊爾邊界地區(qū)。故事是，在成年早期，他放棄了他作為一個住戶（以及他的妻子和年幼的兒子）的舒適生活，以尋求生存痛苦問題的解決方案。他首先與一些不同的流浪禁欲癥患者（[阿拉馬納斯）接觸，他們聲稱知道從苦難中解放的道路。發(fā)現(xiàn)他們的教導不盡如人意，他自己動手，通過洞察力和冥想實踐的結(jié)合，達到了啟蒙（菩提）的狀態(tài)，據(jù)說這代表著停止一切進一步的痛苦。然后，他把余生的45年時間都用在教別人導致他取得這一成就的見解和技術(shù)上。

Gautama could himself be classified as one of the ?ramanas. That there existed such a phenomenon as the ?ramanas tells us that there was some degree of dissatisfaction with the customary religious practices then prevailing in the Gangetic basin of North India. These practices consisted largely in the rituals and sacrifices prescribed in the Vedas. Among the ?ramanas there were many, including the Buddha, who rejected the authority of the Vedas as definitive pronouncements on the nature of the world and our place in it (and for this reason are called 'heterodox’). But within the Vedic canon itself there is a stratum of (comparatively late) texts, the Upani?ads, that likewise displays disaffection with Brahmin ritualism. Among the new ideas that figure in these ('orthodox’) texts, as well as in the teachings of those heterodox ?ramanas whose doctrines are known to us, are the following: that sentient beings (including humans, non-human animals, gods, and the inhabitants of various hells) undergo rebirth; that rebirth is governed by the causal laws of karma (good actions cause pleasant fruit for the agent, evil actions cause unpleasant fruit, etc.); that continual rebirth is inherently unsatisfactory; that there is an ideal state for sentient beings involving liberation from the cycle of rebirth; and that attaining this state requires overcoming ignorance concerning one’s true identity. Various views are offered concerning this ignorance and how to overcome it. The Bhagavad Gītā (classified by some orthodox schools as an Upani?ad) lists four such methods, and discusses at least two separate views concerning our identity: that there is a plurality of distinct selves, each being the true agent of a person’s actions and the bearer of karmic merit and demerit but existing separately from the body and its associated states; and that there is just one self, of the nature of pure consciousness (a 'witness’) and identical with the essence of the cosmos, Brahman or pure undifferentiated Being.高塔瑪自己可以歸類為拉馬納人之一。存在這樣一種現(xiàn)象，如阿拉馬納斯告訴我們，對當時在印度北部甘地盆地盛行的慣常宗教習俗有某種程度的不滿。這些做法主要包括維達斯規(guī)定的儀式和祭品。在拉馬納人中，有許多人，包括佛陀，他們拒絕將維達斯的權(quán)威作為關(guān)于世界性質(zhì)和我們在其中地位的明確聲明（因此被稱為"異質(zhì)體"）。但是，在吠陀本身有一個層次（相對較晚）文本，Upani?ads，同樣表現(xiàn)出對婆羅門儀式主義的不滿。在這些（"正統(tǒng)"）文本中，以及在那些我們熟知的異質(zhì)-拉馬納斯的教義中，有以下新思想：有知覺的生物（包括人類、非人類動物、神和各種地獄的居民）重生：重生受業(yè)力因果規(guī)律的制約（善行為代理人帶來宜人的果實，惡行導致不愉快的果實等）：持續(xù)的重生本質(zhì)上是不能令人滿意的：有一個理想的狀態(tài)，有知覺的人涉及從重生周期的解放：達到這種狀態(tài)需要克服對真實身份的無知。對于這種無知以及如何克服這種無知，人們提出了各種看法。《巴加瓦德Gīt?。ū灰恍┱y(tǒng)學校列為Upani?ad）列舉了四種這種方法，并討論了關(guān)于我們身份的至少兩種不同觀點：一種是多種不同的自我，每種觀點都是一個人行為的真正代理人，是業(yè)力優(yōu)點和缺點的承擔者，但與身體及其相關(guān)國家是分開存在的：只有一個自我，純意識的本質(zhì)（一個"見證人"），與宇宙的本質(zhì)，婆羅門或純粹的無差別存在相同。

The Buddha agreed with those of his contemporaries embarked on the same soteriological project that it is ignorance about our identity that is responsible for suffering. What sets his teachings apart (at this level of analysis) lies in what he says that ignorance consists in: the conceit that there is an 'I’ and a 'mine’. This is the famous Buddhist teaching of non-self (anātman). And it is with this teaching that the controversy begins concerning whether Gautama may legitimately be represented as a philosopher. First there are those who (correctly) point out that the Buddha never categorically denies the existence of a self that transcends what is empirically given, namely the five skandhas or psychophysical elements. While the Buddha does deny that any of the psychophysical elements is a self, these interpreters claim that he at least leaves open the possibility that there is a self that is transcendent in the sense of being non-empirical. To this it may be objected that all of classical Indian philosophy—Buddhist and orthodox alike—understood the Buddha to have denied the self tout court. To this it is sometimes replied that the later philosophical tradition simply got the Buddha wrong, at least in part because the Buddha sought to indicate something that cannot be grasped through the exercise of philosophical rationality. On this interpretation, the Buddha should be seen not as a proponent of the philosophical methods of analysis and argumentation, but rather as one who sees those methods as obstacles to final release.佛陀同意他的同代人開始同一個天體工程，即對我們的身份一無所知，是造成苦難的原因。使他的教導與眾不同的（在這個分析層面上）在于他說無知包括：有一個'我'和'我的'的自負。這是著名的非自我佛教教義。正是在這種教導下，關(guān)于高塔瑪能否合法地被代表為哲學家的爭論開始了。首先，有些人（正確地）指出，佛陀從未斷然否認存在超越經(jīng)驗賦予的自我，即五個斯堪的納達或心理物理元素。雖然佛陀否認任何心理物理元素都是自我，但這些解釋者聲稱，他至少留下了一種可能性，即在非經(jīng)驗意義上，有一種自我是超然的。對此，可以反對印度所有古典哲學——佛教和正統(tǒng)哲學——都理解佛陀否定了自我吹捧的宮廷。對此，有時人們回答說，后來的哲學傳統(tǒng)只是把佛陀搞錯了，至少部分是因為佛陀試圖通過運用哲學理性來指明一些無法把握的東西。關(guān)于這一解釋，佛陀不應被視為分析和論證的哲學方法的支持者，而應被視為將這些方法視為最終釋放的障礙的人。

Another reason one sometimes encounters for denying that the Buddha is a philosopher is that he rejects the characteristically philosophical activity of theorizing about matters that lack evident practical application. On this interpretation as well, those later Buddhist thinkers who did go in for the construction of theories about the ultimate nature of everything simply failed to heed or properly appreciate the Buddha’s advice that we avoid theorizing for its own sake and confine our attention to those matters that are directly relevant to liberation from suffering. On this view the teaching of non-self is not a bit of metaphysics, just some practical advice to the effect that we should avoid identifying with things that are transitory and so bound to yield dissatisfaction. What both interpretations share is the assumption that it is possible to arrive at what the Buddha himself thought without relying on the understanding of his teachings developed in the subsequent Buddhist philosophical tradition.人們有時否認佛陀是哲學家的另一個原因是，他拒絕理論對缺乏明顯實際應用的事項進行理論化的典型哲學活動。對此的解釋，那些后來的佛教思想家，誰確實去建立理論的最終性質(zhì)的一切根本就沒有注意到或適當欣賞佛陀的建議，我們避免理論本身的緣故，并限制我們的注意力，那些直接關(guān)系到從痛苦中解放出來的事情。從這個角度看，非自我的教學不是形而上學的一點，只是一些實際的建議，大意是我們應該避免認同那些暫時性的東西，所以必然會產(chǎn)生不滿。兩種解釋都認為，在不依賴對佛陀在隨后的佛教哲學傳統(tǒng)中發(fā)展起來的教導的理解的情況下，有可能得出佛陀本人的想法。

This assumption may be questioned. Our knowledge of the Buddha’s teachings comes by way of texts that were not written down until several centuries after his death, are in languages (Pāli, and Chinese translations of Sanskrit) other than the one he is likely to have spoken, and disagree in important respects. The first difficulty may not be as serious as it seems, given that the Buddha’s discourses were probably rehearsed shortly after his death and preserved through oral transmission until the time they were committed to writing. And the second need not be insuperable either. But the third is troubling, in that it suggests textual transmission involved processes of insertion and deletion in aid of one side or another in sectarian disputes. Our ancient sources attest to this: one will encounter a dispute among Buddhist thinkers where one side cites some utterance of the Buddha in support of their position, only to have the other side respond that the text from which the quotation is taken is not universally recognized as authoritatively the word of the Buddha. This suggests that our record of the Buddha’s teaching may be colored by the philosophical elaboration of those teachings propounded by later thinkers in the Buddhist tradition.這一假設(shè)可能會受到質(zhì)疑。我們對佛陀教義的了解來自于他死后幾個世紀才寫下來的經(jīng)文，這些文字是用語言（Péli和梵文的中文翻譯）而不是他可能講過的，在重要方面意見不一。第一個困難可能并不像看上去那么嚴重，因為佛陀的話語可能是在他死后不久排練的，并通過口頭傳播保存下來，直到他們致力于寫作的時候。第二個也不必是不可超的。但第三個問題令人不安，因為它表明文本傳輸涉及在宗派爭端中協(xié)助一方或另一方的插入和刪除過程。我們的古代來源證明了這一點：一方引用佛陀的一些話語支持他們的立場，而另一方卻回應說，引用的經(jīng)文并非普遍承認為佛詞的權(quán)威性。這表明，我們對佛陀的教導記錄可能因佛教傳統(tǒng)中后來思想家提出的這些教義的哲學闡述而變色。

Some scholars are more sanguine than others about the possibility of overcoming this difficulty, and thereby getting at what the Buddha himself had thought, as opposed to what later Buddhist philosophers thought he had thought. No position will be taken on this dispute here. We will be treating the Buddha’s thought as it was understood within the later philosophical tradition that he had inspired. The resulting interpretation may or may not be faithful to his intentions. It is at least logically possible that he believed there to be a transcendent self that can only be known by mystical intuition, or that the exercise of philosophical rationality leads only to sterile theorizing and away from real emancipation. What we can say with some assurance is that this is not how the Buddhist philosophical tradition understood him. It is their understanding that will be the subject of this essay.一些學者比其他人更樂觀地認為有可能克服這一困難，從而了解佛陀本人的想法，而不是后來的佛教哲學家認為他所想的。這里不會就這一爭端采取任何立場。我們將對待佛陀的思想，因為它被理解在后來的哲學傳統(tǒng)，他啟發(fā)。由此產(chǎn)生的解釋可能忠實于他的意圖，也可能不忠實。至少從邏輯上講，他相信有一個超越自我，只能通過神秘的直覺來認識，或者哲學理性的運用只會導致無菌的理論化和脫離真正的解放。我們可以肯定地說，這不是佛教哲學傳統(tǒng)理解他的原因。正是他們的理解將成為本文的主題。

2. Core Teachings2. 核心教學

The Buddha’s basic teachings are usually summarized using the device of the Four Noble Truths:佛陀的基本教義通常是用"四圣諦"說四種真理來概括的：

There is suffering.有痛苦。一者、苦圣諦

There is the origination of suffering.苦難的起源二者、集圣諦

There is the cessation of suffering.有停止痛苦三者、滅圣諦

There is a path to the cessation of suffering.有一條停止苦難的道路;四者、道圣諦。

The first of these claims might seem obvious, even when 'suffering’ is understood to mean not mere pain but existential suffering, the sort of frustration, alienation and despair that arise out of our experience of transitoriness. But there are said to be different levels of appreciation of this truth, some quite subtle and difficult to attain; the highest of these is said to involve the realization that everything is of the nature of suffering. Perhaps it is sufficient for present purposes to point out that while this is not the implausible claim that all of life’s states and events are necessarily experienced as unsatisfactory, still the realization that all (oneself included) is impermanent can undermine a precondition for real enjoyment of the events in a life: that such events are meaningful by virtue of their having a place in an open-ended narrative.這些主張中的第一個似乎是顯而易見的，即使"痛苦"被理解為不僅意味著痛苦，而且意味著存在的痛苦，即我們短暫的經(jīng)歷所產(chǎn)生的那種挫折、疏遠和絕望。但據(jù)說對這個真理的欣賞程度不同，有些相當微妙和難以實現(xiàn)：其中最高的據(jù)說涉及認識到一切都是痛苦的本質(zhì)。也許，目前的目的足以指出，雖然這不是難以置信的說法，即所有生活的狀態(tài)和事件都必然經(jīng)歷不盡如人意，但認識到所有（包括自己）都是非長期的，可能會破壞真正享受生活中事件的先決條件：這些事件由于在不限成員名額的敘述中占有一席之地而有意義。

It is with the development and elaboration of (2) that substantive philosophical controversy begins. (2) is the simple claim that there are causes and conditions for the arising of suffering. (3) then makes the obvious point that if the origination of suffering depends on causes, future suffering can be prevented by bringing about the cessation of those causes. (4) specifies a set of techniques that are said to be effective in such cessation. Much then hangs on the correct identification of the causes of suffering. The answer is traditionally spelled out in a list consisting of twelve links in a causal chain that begins with ignorance and ends with suffering (represented by the states of old age, disease and death). Modern scholarship has established that this list is a later compilation. For the texts that claim to convey the Buddha’s own teachings give two slightly different formulations of this list, and shorter formulations containing only some of the twelve items are also found in the texts. But it seems safe to say that the Buddha taught an analysis of the origins of suffering roughly along the following lines: given the existence of a fully functioning assemblage of psychophysical elements (the parts that make up a sentient being), ignorance concerning the three characteristics of sentient existence—suffering, impermanence and non-self—will lead, in the course of normal interactions with the environment, to appropriation (the identification of certain elements as 'I’ and 'mine’). This leads in turn to the formation of attachments, in the form of desire and aversion, and the strengthening of ignorance concerning the true nature of sentient existence. These ensure future rebirth, and thus future instances of old age, disease and death, in a potentially unending cycle.正是隨著（2）的發(fā)展和闡述，實質(zhì)性的哲學爭論開始了。（2）簡單的說法，即痛苦產(chǎn)生的原因和條件。（3）然后明確指出，如果痛苦的起源取決于原因，那么通過停止這些原因可以防止今后的痛苦。（4）指定了一套據(jù)說在此類停止中有效的技術(shù)。然后，許多問題都取決于正確識別痛苦的原因。答案傳統(tǒng)上在一份清單中闡明，該列表由因果鏈中的十二個環(huán)節(jié)組成，這些環(huán)節(jié)以無知開始，以痛苦結(jié)束（以老年、疾病和死亡狀態(tài)表示）?，F(xiàn)代獎學金已經(jīng)確定，這個名單是一個后來的匯編。對于聲稱傳達佛陀自己教導的文本，本清單有兩種略有不同的提法，文本中也含有12個項目中的一部分。但可以肯定地說，佛陀教導了對苦難起源的分析，大致大致如下：鑒于心理物理元素（構(gòu)成有知覺存在的部分）的功能齊全的組合存在，對有知覺存在的三個特征的無知——痛苦、無常和非自我——將導致與環(huán)境的正常相互作用。，撥款（確定某些元素為"我"和"我的"）。這反過來又導致以欲望和厭惡的形式形成依戀，以及加強對有知覺存在的真正本質(zhì)的無知。這些確保未來的重生，從而在未來的老年，疾病和死亡的情況下，在一個潛在的無休止的周期。

The key to escape from this cycle is said to lie in realization of the truth about sentient existence—that it is characterized by suffering, impermanence and non-self. But this realization is not easily achieved, since acts of appropriation have already made desire, aversion and ignorance deeply entrenched habits of mind. Thus the measures specified in (4) include various forms of training designed to replace such habits with others that are more conducive to seeing things as they are. Training in meditation is also prescribed, as a way of enhancing one’s observational abilities, especially with respect to one’s own psychological states. Insight is cultivated through the use of these newly developed observational powers, as informed by knowledge acquired through the exercise of philosophical rationality. There is a debate in the later tradition as to whether final release can be attained through theoretical insight alone, through meditation alone, or only by using both techniques. Ch’an, for instance, is based on the premise that enlightenment can be attained through meditation alone, whereas Theravāda advocates using both but also holds that analysis alone may be sufficient for some. (This disagreement begins with a dispute over how to interpret D I.77–84.) The third option seems the most plausible, but the first is certainly of some interest given its suggestion that one can attain the ideal state for humans just by doing philosophy.據(jù)說，擺脫這個循環(huán)的關(guān)鍵在于實現(xiàn)關(guān)于有知覺存在的真理——它的特點是痛苦、無能和非自我。但是，這種認識并非易事，因為侵占行為已經(jīng)使欲望、厭惡和無知成為根深蒂固的習慣。因此，（4）中規(guī)定的措施包括各種形式的培訓，旨在用更有利于看到事物的習慣來取代這種習慣。冥想訓練也是提高觀察能力的一種方式，特別是對一個人的心理狀態(tài)。洞察力是利用這些新發(fā)展的觀察能力培養(yǎng)的，而這種能力是通過運用哲學理性獲得的知識所提供的。在后來的傳統(tǒng)中，人們爭論的是，最終的釋放是僅僅通過理論洞察才能實現(xiàn)的，僅僅通過冥想，還是只能通過使用這兩種技術(shù)來實現(xiàn)。例如，Ch'an的前提是，只有冥想才能獲得啟蒙，而塞拉瓦達主張同時使用這兩種療法，但也認為，單靠分析對有些人來說可能就足夠了。（這種分歧始于關(guān)于如何解釋D I.77-84的爭論。第三種選擇似乎最合理，但第一種選擇肯定是一些興趣，因為它的建議，一個人可以達到理想的狀態(tài)，人類只是通過做哲學。

The Buddha seems to have held (2) to constitute the core of his discovery. He calls his teachings a 'middle path’ between two extreme views, and it is this claim concerning the causal origins of suffering that he identifies as the key to avoiding those extremes. The extremes are eternalism, the view that persons are eternal, and annihilationism, the view that persons go utterly out of existence (usually understood to mean at death, though a term still shorter than one lifetime is not ruled out). It will be apparent that eternalism requires the existence of the sort of self that the Buddha denies. What is not immediately evident is why the denial of such a self is not tantamount to the claim that the person is annihilated at death (or even sooner, depending on just how impermanent one takes the psychophysical elements to be). The solution to this puzzle lies in the fact that eternalism and annihilationism both share the presupposition that there is an 'I’ whose existence might either extend beyond death or terminate at death. The idea of the 'middle path’ is that all of life’s continuities can be explained in terms of facts about a causal series of psychophysical elements. There being nothing more than a succession of these impermanent, impersonal events and states, the question of the ultimate fate of this 'I’, the supposed owner of these elements, simply does not arise.佛陀似乎已經(jīng)舉行了（2）構(gòu)成他的發(fā)現(xiàn)的核心。他稱他的教導是兩種極端觀點之間的"中間道路"，正是這種關(guān)于痛苦因果起源的說法，他認為這是避免這些極端觀點的關(guān)鍵。極端是永恒主義、人是永恒的觀點和毀滅主義，即人完全不存在的觀點（通常理解為死亡時的意思，盡管不排除一個任期仍然短于一生）。顯然，永恒主義需要佛陀所否認的那種自我的存在。不立即顯而易見的是，為什么否認這種自我并不等于聲稱這個人在死亡時被消滅（甚至更早，這取決于一個人對心理物理元素的無常程度）。解決這個難題的辦法在于，永恒主義和毀滅主義都有著共同的前提，即有一個'我'的存在可能超越死亡或在死亡時終止。"中間路徑"的概念是，所有生命的連續(xù)性都可以用一系列精神物理因素的因果關(guān)系來解釋。這些非個人化的事件和狀態(tài)接二連三，這個"我"的最終命運問題，這些元素的所謂所有者，根本就沒有出現(xiàn)。

This reductionist view of sentient beings was later articulated in terms of the distinction between two kinds of truth, conventional and ultimate. Each kind of truth has its own domain of objects, the things that are only conventionally real and the things that are ultimately real respectively. Conventionally real entities are those things that are accepted as real by common sense, but that turn out on further analysis to be wholes compounded out of simpler entities and thus not strictly speaking real at all. The stock example of a conventionally real entity is the chariot, which we take to be real only because it is more convenient, given our interests and cognitive limitations, to have a single name for the parts when assembled in the right way. Since our belief that there are chariots is thus due to our having a certain useful concept, the chariot is said to be a mere conceptual fiction. (This does not, however, mean that all conceptualization is falsification; only concepts that allow of reductive analysis lead to this artificial inflation of our ontology, and thus to a kind of error.) Ultimately real entities are those ultimate parts into which conceptual fictions are analyzable. An ultimately true statement is one that correctly describes how certain ultimately real entities are arranged. A conventionally true statement is one that, given how the ultimately real entities are arranged, would correctly describe certain conceptual fictions if they also existed. The ultimate truth concerning the relevant ultimately real entities helps explain why it should turn out to be useful to accept conventionally true statements (such as 'King Milinda rode in a chariot’) when the objects described in those statements are mere fictions.這種對有知覺存在的看法后來從傳統(tǒng)和終極兩種真理的區(qū)別中闡明。每一種真理都有它自己的對象領(lǐng)域，只有傳統(tǒng)真實的東西和最終是真實的事物。傳統(tǒng)意義上的實體是常識所接受的真實實體，但經(jīng)過進一步分析后發(fā)現(xiàn)，這些實體整體是由較簡單的實體復合而成的，因此根本不嚴格地說是真實的。傳統(tǒng)真實實體的股票示例是戰(zhàn)車，我們之所以認為戰(zhàn)車是真實的，只是因為考慮到我們的興趣和認知限制，在以正確的方式組裝部件時，對零件有一個單一名稱更為方便。由于我們相信有戰(zhàn)車，因此我們有一個有用的概念，戰(zhàn)車據(jù)說只是一個概念小說。（然而，這并不意味著所有概念化都是偽造的;只有允許還原分析的概念導致本體論的這種人為膨脹，從而導致一種錯誤。歸根結(jié)底，真正的實體是概念小說可以分析的終極部分。最終真實的陳述是正確描述最終確定真實實體的排列方式。傳統(tǒng)的真實陳述是，鑒于最終真正的實體是如何排列的，如果某些概念小說也存在，它將正確地描述它們。關(guān)于相關(guān)最終真實實體的最終真相有助于解釋為什么當這些陳述中描述的對象僅僅是虛構(gòu)的時，接受傳統(tǒng)真實陳述（如"米琳達國王乘坐戰(zhàn)車"）應該是有用的。

Using this distinction between the two truths, the key insight of the 'middle path’ may be expressed as follows. The ultimate truth about sentient beings is just that there is a causal series of impermanent, impersonal psychophysical elements. Since these are all impermanent, and lack other properties that would be required of an essence of the person, none of them is a self. But given the right arrangement of such entities in a causal series, it is useful to think of them as making up one thing, a person. It is thus conventionally true that there are persons, things that endure for a lifetime and possibly (if there is rebirth) longer. This is conventionally true because generally speaking there is more overall happiness and less overall pain and suffering when one part of such a series identifies with other parts of the same series. For instance, when the present set of psychophysical elements identifies with future elements, it is less likely to engage in behavior (such as smoking) that results in present pleasure but far greater future pain. The utility of this convention is, however, limited. Past a certain point—namely the point at which we take it too seriously, as more than just a useful fiction—it results in existential suffering. The cessation of suffering is attained by extirpating all sense of an 'I’ that serves as agent and owner.利用這兩個真理之間的區(qū)別，"中間道路"的關(guān)鍵見解可以表達如下。關(guān)于有知覺的人類的終極真理只是有一系列非常的、非個人的精神物理元素的因果關(guān)系。由于這些都是不精確的，并缺乏其他屬性，將需要人的本質(zhì)，他們都不是一個自我。但是，鑒于這些實體在因果系列中的正確安排，將它們視為一個人的一件事是有用的。因此，傳統(tǒng)上，有的人，東西，持續(xù)一輩子，并可能（如果有重生）更長的時間。這是常規(guī)正確的，因為一般來說，當此類系列的一部分與同一系列的其他部分認同時，整體幸福感更高，整體痛苦和痛苦更少。例如，當目前的一組心理物理元素與未來的元素認同時，它不太可能從事行為（如吸煙），導致現(xiàn)在的樂趣，但更大的未來痛苦。然而，這項公約的效用是有限的。過去的某一點——即我們把它看得太重的點，不僅僅是一個有用的小說——它導致了生存的痛苦。停止痛苦是通過消除作為代理人和所有者的"我"的所有感覺來實現(xiàn)的。

3. Non-Self3. 非自我

The Buddha’s 'middle path’ strategy can be seen as one of first arguing that there is nothing that the word 'I’ genuinely denotes, and then explaining that our erroneous sense of an 'I’ stems from our employment of the useful fiction represented by the concept of the person. While the second part of this strategy only receives its full articulation in the later development of the theory of two truths, the first part can be found in the Buddha’s own teachings, in the form of several philosophical arguments for non-self. Best known among these is the argument from impermanence (S III.66–8), which has this basic structure:佛陀的"中間道路"策略可以被看作是第一次爭辯說，"我"這個詞沒有真正表示的，然后解釋我們的錯誤意義上的'我'源于我們雇用了以人的概念為代表的有用的小說。雖然這一戰(zhàn)略的第二部分只有在兩個真理理論的后期發(fā)展中才能得到充分闡述，但第一部分可以在佛陀自己的教義中找到，其形式是非自我的若干哲學論據(jù)。其中最有名的是來自無懈可境的論點（S III.66-8），它有這個基本結(jié)構(gòu)：

If there were a self it would be permanent.如果有一個自我，這將是永久的。

None of the five kinds of psychophysical element is permanent.這五種心理物理元素中沒有一種是永久性的。

∴ There is no self.沒有自我。

It is the fact that this argument does not contain a premise explicitly asserting that the five skandhas (classes of psychophysical element) are exhaustive of the constituents of persons, plus the fact that these are all said to be empirically observable, that leads some to claim that the Buddha did not intend to deny the existence of a self tout court. There is, however, evidence that the Buddha was generally hostile toward attempts to establish the existence of unobservable entities. In the Pohapāda Sutta (D I.178–203), for instance, the Buddha compares someone who posits an unseen seer in order to explain our introspective awareness of cognitions, to a man who has conceived a longing for the most beautiful woman in the world based solely on the thought that such a woman must surely exist. And in the Tevijja Sutta (D I.235–52), the Buddha rejects the claim of certain Brahmins to know the path to oneness with Brahman, on the grounds that no one has actually observed this Brahman. This makes more plausible the assumption that the argument has as an implicit premise the claim that there is no more to the person than the five skandhas.事實上，這一論點沒有明確聲稱五個斯坎達（精神物理元素類別）是詳盡的人的組成，加上事實，這些都說是經(jīng)驗觀察，導致一些人聲稱，佛陀并不打算否認存在一個自我吹捧的法院。然而，有證據(jù)表明，佛陀通常對建立不為人注意的實體存在的企圖懷有敵意。例如，在《波哈佩達·蘇塔》（D I.178-203）中，佛陀將一個假設(shè)一個看不見的預言家來解釋我們內(nèi)省認知意識的人比作一個僅僅基于這樣一個女人必須存在的思想而孕育了對世界上最美麗的女人的渴望的男人。在Tevijja Sutta（D I.235-52）中，佛陀拒絕某些婆羅門人的說法，即知道與婆羅門合一的道路，理由是沒有人真正觀察過這個婆羅門。這使得更合理的假設(shè)，即該論點有一個隱含的前提，聲稱沒有比五個斯坎達人更多的人。

Premise (1) appears to be based on the assumption that persons undergo rebirth, together with the thought that one function of a self would be to account for diachronic personal identity. By 'permanent’ is here meant continued existence over at least several lives. This is shown by the fact that the Buddha rules out the body as a self on the grounds that the body exists for just one lifetime. (This also demonstrates that the Buddha did not mean by 'impermanent’ what some later Buddhist philosophers meant, viz., existing for just a moment; the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness represents a later development.) The mental entities that make up the remaining four types of psychophysical element might seem like more promising candidates, but these are ruled out on the grounds that these all originate in dependence on contact between sense faculty and object, and last no longer than a particular sense-object-contact event. That he listed five kinds of psychophysical element, and not just one, shows that the Buddha embraced a kind of dualism. But this strategy for demonstrating the impermanence of the psychological elements shows that his dualism was not the sort of mind-body dualism familiar from substance ontologies like those of Descartes and of the Nyāya school of orthodox Indian philosophy. Instead of seeing the mind as the persisting bearer of such transient events as occurrences of cognition, feeling and volition, he treats 'mind’ as a kind of aggregate term for bundles of transient mental events. These events being impermanent, they too fail to account for diachronic personal identity in the way in which a self might be expected to.前提（1）似乎基于人們經(jīng)歷重生的假設(shè)，以及認為自我的一個功能是解釋過時的個人身份。這里的"永久"意味著至少幾個生命的繼續(xù)存在。佛陀以身體只存在一輩子為由，排除了身體作為自我。（這也表明，佛陀并不是指"無常"的意思，即一些后來的佛教哲學家的意思，即僅僅存在片刻;佛教的瞬間學說代表著后來的發(fā)展。構(gòu)成其余四種心理物理元素的精神實體可能看起來更有前途，但排除了這些可能性，理由是這些實體都源于對感官教員和對象之間接觸的依賴，并且持續(xù)的時間不超過特定的感官對象接觸事件。他列舉了五種心理物理元素，而不僅僅是一種，這表明佛陀接受了一種二元論。但是，這種展示心理因素無常性的戰(zhàn)略表明，他的二元論并不是像笛卡爾和尼雅正統(tǒng)印度哲學派那樣從物質(zhì)本體學中熟悉的那種身心二元論。他沒有把頭腦看作是認知、感覺和意志等短暫事件的持久攜帶者，而是將"頭腦"視為一系列短暫心理事件的總術(shù)語。這些事件是無能的，它們也沒有以自我被期望的方式解釋過時的個人身份。

Another argument for non-self, which might be called the argument from control (S III.66–8), has this structure:非自我的另一個論點，可能被稱為控制參數(shù)（S III.66-8），有這種結(jié)構(gòu)：

If there were a self, one could never desire that it be changed.如果有一個自我，一個人永遠不能渴望它被改變。

Each of the five kinds of psychophysical element is such that one can desire that it be changed.

五種心理物理元素中的每一種都是如此，以至于人們都渴望改變它。

∴ There is no self.∴沒有自我。

Premise (1) is puzzling. It appears to presuppose that the self should have complete control over itself, so that it would effortlessly adjust its state to its desires. That the self should be thought of as the locus of control is certainly plausible. Those Indian self-theorists who claim that the self is a mere passive witness recognize that the burden of proof is on them to show that the self is not an agent. But it seems implausibly demanding to require of the self that it have complete control over itself. We do not require that vision see itself if it is to see other things. The case of vision suggests an alternative interpretation, however. We might hold that vision does not see itself for the reason that this would violate an irreflexivity principle, to the effect that an entity cannot operate on itself. Indian philosophers who accept this principle cite supportive instances such as the knife that cannot cut itself and the finger-tip that cannot touch itself. If this principle is accepted, then if the self were the locus of control it would follow that it could never exercise this function on itself. A self that was the controller could never find itself in the position of seeking to change its state to one that it deemed more desirable. On this interpretation, the first premise seems to be true. And there is ample evidence that (2) is true: it is difficult to imagine a bodily or psychological state over which one might not wish to exercise control. Consequently, given the assumption that the person is wholly composed of the psychophysical elements, it appears to follow that a self of this description does not exist.前提（1）令人費解。它似乎以自我應該完全控制自己為前提，這樣它就會毫不費力地根據(jù)自己的欲望調(diào)整自己的狀態(tài)。自我應該被認為是控制之地，這當然是合理的。那些聲稱自己只是被動證人的印度自我理論家認識到，舉證責任在于他們來證明自己不是代理人。但它似乎難以置信地要求自己完全控制自己。我們不需要這種愿景看到自己，如果它要看到其他的東西。然而，視覺案例提出了另一種解釋。我們可能認為，這種愿景并不認為這樣做會違反一個不靈活的原則，大意是一個實體不能自行運作。接受這一原則的印度哲學家列舉了一些支持性的例子，如不能割傷自己的刀和不能觸摸自己的指尖。如果這一原則被接受，那么如果自我是控制之地，它就永遠無法自行行使這一功能。自我控制者永遠無法發(fā)現(xiàn)自己處于尋求將其狀態(tài)更改為它認為更可取的狀態(tài)的位置。對此的解釋，第一個前提似乎是真的。有充分證據(jù)表明（2）是真的：很難想象身體或心理狀態(tài)，一個人可能不希望行使控制。因此，鑒于假設(shè)此人完全由心理物理元素組成，似乎不存在這種描述的自我。

These two arguments appear, then, to give good reason to deny a self that might ground diachronic personal identity and serve as locus of control, given the assumption that there is no more to the person than the empirically given psychophysical elements. But it now becomes something of a puzzle how one is to explain diachronic personal identity and agency. To start with the latter, does the argument from control not suggest that control must be exercised by something other than the psychophysical elements? This was precisely the conclusion of the Sā?khya school of orthodox Indian philosophy. One of their arguments for the existence of a self was that it is possible to exercise control over all the empirically given constituents of the person; while they agree with the Buddha that a self is never observed, they take the phenomena of agency to be grounds for positing a self that transcends all possible experience.因此，這兩個論點似乎可以給出充分的理由來否認一種可能導致二元個人身份并作為控制點的自我，因為假設(shè)對人而言，沒有比經(jīng)驗賦予的精神物理元素更多的了。但現(xiàn)在，如何解釋二元化的個人身份和代理權(quán)成了一個謎。從后者開始，控制的論點難道不表明控制必須由心理物理因素以外的其他因素來行使嗎？這正是Sā?khya正統(tǒng)印度哲學學派的結(jié)論。他們關(guān)于自我存在的論點之一是，有可能對人的所有經(jīng)驗賦予的選民進行控制：雖然他們同意佛陀的觀點，即一個自我從未被觀察過，但他們認為代理的現(xiàn)象是假設(shè)一個超越一切可能的經(jīng)驗的自我的理由。

This line of objection to the Buddha’s teaching of non-self is more commonly formulated in response to the argument from impermanence, however. Perhaps its most dramatic form is aimed at the Buddha’s acceptance of the doctrines of karma and rebirth. It is clear that the body ceases to exist at death. And given the Buddha’s argument that mental states all originate in dependence on sense-object contact events, it seems no psychological constituent of the person can transmigrate either. Yet the Buddha claims that persons who have not yet achieved enlightenment will be reborn as sentient beings of some sort after they die. If there is no constituent whatever that moves from one life to the next, how could the being in the next life be the same person as the being in this life? This question becomes all the more pointed when it is added that rebirth is governed by karma, something that functions as a kind of cosmic justice: those born into fortunate circumstances do so as a result of good deeds in prior lives, while unpleasant births result from evil past deeds. Such a system of reward and punishment could be just only if the recipient of pleasant or unpleasant karmic fruit is the same person as the agent of the good or evil action. And the opponent finds it incomprehensible how this could be so in the absence of a persisting self.然而，這種反對佛陀非自我教導的路線，更常見地是針對無常的論點而制定的。也許它最戲劇性的形式是佛陀接受業(yè)力和重生的教義。很明顯，尸體在死亡時就不存在了。鑒于佛陀的論點是，精神狀態(tài)都源于對感官對象接觸事件的依賴，似乎也沒有心理成分的人可以移民。然而，佛陀聲稱，尚未獲得啟蒙的人在死后將作為某種有知覺的人重生。如果沒有從一個生命到下一個生命的任何成分，下輩子的人怎么會和今生是同一個人呢？當增加重生受業(yè)力支配時，這個問題就變得更加尖銳了，業(yè)力是一種宇宙正義：那些出生在幸運環(huán)境中的人是因前一生的善行而生的，而不愉快的出生是過去邪惡行為的結(jié)果。只有當愉快或不愉快的業(yè)力水果的接受者與善惡行為的代理人是同一個人時，這種獎懲制度才能存在。對手發(fā)現(xiàn)，如果沒有一個堅持的自我，怎么會如此難以理解。

4. Karma and Rebirth 卡瑪和重生

It is not just classical Indian self-theorists who have found this objection persuasive. Some Buddhists have as well. Among these Buddhists, however, this has led to the rejection not of non-self but of rebirth. (Historically this response was not unknown among East Asian Buddhists, and it is not rare among Western Buddhists today.) The evidence that the Buddha himself accepted rebirth and karma seems quite strong, however. The later tradition would distinguish between two types of discourse in the body of the Buddha’s teachings: those intended for an audience of householders seeking instruction from a sage, and those intended for an audience of monastic renunciates already versed in his teachings. And it would be one thing if his use of the concepts of karma and rebirth were limited to the former. For then such appeals could be explained away as another instance of the Buddha’s pedagogical skill (commonly referred to as upāya). The idea would be that householders who fail to comply with the most basic demands of morality are not likely (for reasons to be discussed shortly) to make significant progress toward the cessation of suffering, and the teaching of karma and rebirth, even if not strictly speaking true, does give those who accept it a (prudential) reason to be moral. But this sort of 'noble lie’ justification for the Buddha teaching a doctrine he does not accept fails in the face of the evidence that he also taught it to quite advanced monastics (e.g., A III.33). And what he taught is not the version of karma popular in certain circles today, according to which, for instance, an act done out of hatred makes the agent somewhat more disposed to perform similar actions out of similar motives in the future, which in turn makes negative experiences more likely for the agent. What the Buddha teaches is instead the far stricter view that each action has its own specific consequence for the agent, the hedonic nature of which is determined in accordance with causal laws and in such a way as to require rebirth as long as action continues. So if there is a conflict between the doctrine of non-self and the teaching of karma and rebirth, it is not to be resolved by weakening the Buddha’s commitment to the latter.發(fā)現(xiàn)這一反對意見有說服力的不僅僅是印度古典的自我理論家。一些佛教徒也有。然而，在這些佛教徒中，這導致了拒絕的不是非自我，而是重生。（從歷史上看，東亞佛教徒對此的反應并不為人所知，在當今西方佛教徒中也不罕見。然而，佛陀本人接受重生和業(yè)力的證據(jù)似乎相當有力。后來的傳統(tǒng)將區(qū)分佛陀教義中兩種類型的話語：一種是供尋求圣人教導的住戶的話語，另一種是供已經(jīng)精通他教導的寺院牧師的話語。如果他對業(yè)力和重生概念的使用僅限于前者，那將是一回事。因此，這種呼吁可以解釋為佛陀的教學技巧的另一個例子（通常稱為烏普雅）。其理念是，不遵守最基本的道德要求的住戶不太可能（因為不久將要討論的理由）在停止苦難方面取得重大進展，而業(yè)力和重生的教導，即使嚴格地說不屬實，也確實給那些接受它的人一個（謹慎的）道德理由。但是，這種"高貴的謊言"的理由，佛陀教一個教義，他不接受失敗，面對的證據(jù)，他也教給相當先進的寺院（如A III.33）。他所教導的不是當今某些圈子里流行的業(yè)力版本，例如，根據(jù)這種版本，出于仇恨而做出的行為使代理人更愿意在未來出于類似動機采取類似行動，這反過來又使代理人更有可能經(jīng)歷負面經(jīng)歷。相反，佛陀教導的是，每一個動作都有其自身對代理人的具體后果，其享樂性質(zhì)是根據(jù)因果法確定的，只要行動繼續(xù)下去，就需要重生。因此，如果非自我教義與業(yè)力和重生的教導之間存在沖突，就不能通過削弱佛陀對后者的承諾來解決。

The Sanskrit term karma literally means 'action’. What is nowadays referred to somewhat loosely as the theory of karma is, speaking more strictly, the view that there is a causal relationship between action (karma) and 'fruit’ (phala), the latter being an experience of pleasure, pain or indifference for the agent of the action. This is the view that the Buddha appears to have accepted in its most straightforward form. Actions are said to be of three types: bodily, verbal and mental. The Buddha insists, however, that by action is meant not the movement or change involved, but rather the volition or intention that brought about the change. As Gombrich (2009) points out, the Buddha’s insistence on this point reflects the transition from an earlier ritualistic view of action to a view that brings action within the purview of ethics. For it is when actions are seen as subject to moral assessment that intention becomes relevant. One does not, for instance, perform the morally blameworthy action of speaking insultingly to an elder just by making sounds that approximate to the pronunciation of profanities in the presence of an elder; parrots and prelinguistic children can do as much. What matters for moral assessment is the mental state (if any) that produced the bodily, verbal or mental change. And it is the occurrence of these mental states that is said to cause the subsequent occurrence of hedonically good, bad and neutral experiences. More specifically, it is the occurrence of the three 'defiled’ mental states that brings about karmic fruit. The three defilements (kle?as) are desire, aversion and ignorance. And we are told quite specifically (A III.33) that actions performed by an agent in whom these three defilements have been destroyed do not have karmic consequences; such an agent is experiencing their last birth.梵語術(shù)語業(yè)力字面意思是"行動"?，F(xiàn)在所說的業(yè)力理論有些松散，更嚴格地說，認為行動（業(yè)力）和"水果"（phala）之間存在因果關(guān)系，后者是行動的代理人的快樂、痛苦或冷漠的經(jīng)歷。這是佛陀似乎以最直接的形式接受的觀點。據(jù)說行動有三種類型：身體、言語和精神。然而，佛陀堅持認為，行動不是指所涉及的運動或改變，而是帶來改變的意志或意圖。正如貢布里希（2009年）指出的，佛陀堅持這一點反映了從早期的儀式性行動觀向?qū)⑿袆訋氲赖路懂牭挠^點的轉(zhuǎn)變。因為當行動被視為受道德評估時，意圖才變得相關(guān)。例如，人們不采取道德上應受責備的行為，僅僅通過發(fā)出與長者在場時褻瀆的發(fā)音相近的聲音來侮辱長者：鸚鵡和語言學前的孩子可以做盡可能多的。道德評估的關(guān)鍵是產(chǎn)生身體、言語或精神變化的精神狀態(tài)（如果有的話）。正是這些精神狀態(tài)的發(fā)生，據(jù)說導致隨后的享樂好，壞和中立的經(jīng)驗的發(fā)生。更具體地說，是三種"污穢"的精神狀態(tài)的發(fā)生帶來了業(yè)力果實。這三種污穢是欲望、厭惡和無知。我們非常具體地被告知（A III.33），銷毀這三種污穢的代理人所采取的行動不會產(chǎn)生業(yè)力后果：這樣的代理人正在經(jīng)歷他們的最后一次出生。

Some caution is required in understanding this claim about the defilements. The Buddha seems to be saying that it is possible to act not only without ignorance, but also in the absence of desire or aversion, yet it is difficult to see how there could be intentional action without some positive or negative motivation. To see one’s way around this difficulty, one must realize that by 'desire’ and 'aversion’ are meant those positive and negative motives respectively that are colored by ignorance, viz. ignorance concerning suffering, impermanence and non-self. Presumably the enlightened person, while knowing the truth about these matters, can still engage in motivated action. Their actions are not based on the presupposition that there is an 'I’ for which those actions can have significance. Ignorance concerning these matters perpetuates rebirth, and thus further occasions for existential suffering, by facilitating a motivational structure that reinforces one’s ignorance. We can now see how compliance with common-sense morality could be seen as an initial step on the path to the cessation of suffering. While the presence of ignorance makes all action—even that deemed morally good—karmically potent, those actions commonly considered morally evil are especially powerful reinforcers of ignorance, in that they stem from the assumption that the agent’s welfare is of paramount importance. While recognition of the moral value of others may still involve the conceit that there is an 'I’, it can nonetheless constitute progress toward dissolution of the sense of self.在理解這一關(guān)于污穢的說法時需要謹慎一些。佛陀似乎在說，不僅在沒有無知的情況下，而且在沒有欲望或厭惡的情況下，也有可能采取行動，然而，如果沒有一些積極或消極的動機，很難看出怎么會有故意的行動。要想看到自己如何繞過這個困難，必須認識到，"欲望"和"厭惡"分別是指那些被無知所影響的積極和消極的動機，即對苦難、無禮和非自我的無知。大概開明的人，雖然知道這些事情的真相，仍然可以從事積極的行動。他們的行動不是基于這樣的前提，即有一個"我"，這些行動可能具有重大意義。對這些問題的無知通過促進一種強化無知的動機結(jié)構(gòu)，使重生，從而進一步加劇存在的痛苦。我們現(xiàn)在可以看到，遵守常識性道德如何被視為在停止苦難的道路上邁出的第一步。雖然無知的存在使一切行動——即使被認為是道德上好的——在業(yè)力上是有力的，但那些通常被認為是道德邪惡的行為是無知的有力強化者，因為它們源于這樣一種假設(shè)，即代理人的福利至關(guān)重要。雖然承認他人的道德價值可能仍然涉及有"我"的自負，但它仍可能構(gòu)成在自我意識的消解方面取得的進展。

This excursus into what the Buddha meant by karma may help us see how his middle path strategy could be used to reply to the objection to non-self from rebirth. That objection was that the reward and punishment generated by karma across lives could never be deserved in the absence of a transmigrating self. The middle path strategy generally involves locating and rejecting an assumption shared by a pair of extreme views. In this case the views will be (1) that the person in the later life deserves the fruit generated by the action in the earlier life, and (2) that this person does not deserve the fruit. One assumption shared by (1) and (2) is that persons deserve reward and punishment depending on the moral character of their actions, and one might deny this assumption. But that would be tantamount to moral nihilism, and a middle path is said to avoid nihilisms (such as annihilationism). A more promising alternative might be to deny that there are ultimately such things as persons that could bear moral properties like desert. This is what the Buddha seems to mean when he asserts that the earlier and the later person are neither the same nor different (S II.62; S II.76; S II.113). Since any two existing things must be either identical or distinct, to say of the two persons that they are neither is to say that strictly speaking they do not exist.這次對佛陀的業(yè)力意義的游覽，可能有助于我們了解他的中間道路策略如何被用來回應對非自我從重生的反對。這種反對意見是，在沒有移民自我的情況下，業(yè)力在生活中產(chǎn)生的獎勵和懲罰是永遠不值得的。中間路徑策略通常涉及定位和拒絕由一對極端觀點共享的假設(shè)。在這種情況下，人們的看法是：（1）晚年的人應該得到早年行動所產(chǎn)生的果實;（2）這個人不配得到結(jié)果。（1）和（2）共有的一個假設(shè)是，根據(jù)行為的道德性質(zhì)，人們應該得到獎勵和懲罰，人們可能會否認這一假設(shè)。但這無異于道德虛無主義，據(jù)說中間道路可以避免虛無主義（如毀滅主義）。一個更有前途的選擇可能是否認最終有諸如人可以承受沙漠等道德屬性的東西。這就是佛陀聲稱前人和后人既不相同也不不同時的意思（S II.62：S II.76：S II.113）。既然現(xiàn)存的兩樣東西必須相同或不同，所以說這兩個人，他們兩者都不是，就是嚴格地說，它們并不存在。

This alternative is more promising because it avoids moral nihilism. For it allows one to assert that persons and their moral properties are conventionally real. To say this is to say that given our interests and cognitive limitations, we do better at achieving our aim—minimizing overall pain and suffering—by acting as though there are persons with morally significant properties. Ultimately there are just impersonal entities and events in causal sequence: ignorance, the sorts of desires that ignorance facilitates, an intention formed on the basis of such a desire, a bodily, verbal or mental action, a feeling of pleasure, pain or indifference, and an occasion of suffering. The claim is that this situation is usefully thought of as, for instance, a person who performs an evil deed due to their ignorance of the true nature of things, receives the unpleasant fruit they deserve in the next life, and suffers through their continuing on the wheel of sa?sāra. It is useful to think of the situation in this way because it helps us locate the appropriate places to intervene to prevent future pain (the evil deed) and future suffering (ignorance).這種選擇更有希望，因為它避免了道德虛無主義。因為它允許人們斷言人及其道德屬性是傳統(tǒng)意義上的真實。說這話就是說，鑒于我們的興趣和認知限制，我們更好地實現(xiàn)我們的目標——盡量減少整體的痛苦和痛苦——表現(xiàn)得好像有些人具有道德上的重要屬性。歸根結(jié)底，只有非個人實體和因果順序的事件：無知、無知所促成的欲望、基于這種欲望形成的意圖、身體、言語或精神行為、快樂感、痛苦或冷漠感，以及痛苦的時刻。這種說法是，這種情況被認為是有用的，例如，一個人誰執(zhí)行一個邪惡的事，因為他們不知道事情的真實性質(zhì)，收到他們不愉快的果實，他們應得的下輩子，并通過他們繼續(xù)在sa?sāra的車輪上受苦。以這種方式思考這種情況是有用的，因為它幫助我們找到適當?shù)母深A地點，以防止未來的痛苦（惡行）和未來的苦難（無知）。

It is no doubt quite difficult to believe that karma and rebirth exist in the form that the Buddha claims. It is said that their existence can be confirmed by those who have developed the power of retrocognition through advanced yogic technique. But this is of little help to those not already convinced that meditation is a reliable means of knowledge. What can be said with some assurance is that karma and rebirth are not inconsistent with non-self. Rebirth without transmigration is logically possible.毫無疑問，很難相信業(yè)力和重生以佛陀所宣稱的形式存在。據(jù)說，它們的存在可以通過先進的瑜伽技術(shù)來證實那些已經(jīng)發(fā)展出逆向認知能力的人。但是，對于那些還不相信冥想是一種可靠的知識手段的人來說，這沒有什么幫助?？梢钥隙ǖ卣f，業(yè)力和重生與非自我并不矛盾。沒有輪回的重生在邏輯上是可能的.

5. Attitude toward Reason 對理性的態(tài)度

When the Buddha says that a person in one life and the person in another life are neither the same nor different, one’s first response might be to take 'different’ to mean something other than 'not the same’. But while this is possible in English given the ambiguity of 'the same’, it is not possible in the Pāli source, where the Buddha is represented as unambiguously denying both numerical identity and numerical distinctness. This has led some to wonder whether the Buddha does not employ a deviant logic. Such suspicions are strengthened by those cases where the options are not two but four, cases of the so-called tetralemma (catu?ko?i). For instance, when the Buddha is questioned about the post-mortem status of the enlightened person or arhat (e.g., at M I.483–8) the possibilities are listed as: (1) the arhat continues to exist after death, (2) does not exist after death, (3) both exists and does not exist after death, and (4) neither exists nor does not exist after death. When the Buddha rejects both (1) and (2) we get a repetition of 'neither the same nor different’. But when he goes on to entertain, and then reject, (3) and (4) the logical difficulties are compounded. Since each of (3) and (4) appears to be formally contradictory, to entertain either is to entertain the possibility that a contradiction might be true. And their denial seems tantamount to affirmation of excluded middle, which is prima facie incompatible with the denial of both (1) and (2). One might wonder whether we are here in the presence of the mystical.當佛陀說一個人在一個生命中，一個人在另一個生命中既不相同也不不同時，一個人的第一反應可能是采取"不同"來表示"不一樣"以外的其他東西。但是，盡管鑒于"相同"的模糊性，這在英語中是可能的，但在Péli來源中是不可能的，因為佛陀被明確地否認數(shù)字特征和數(shù)字特征。這讓一些人懷疑佛陀是否沒有采用一種反常的邏輯。這種懷疑因那些選擇不是兩個而是四個，即所謂的四重奏（catu?ko?i）的案件而得到加強。例如，當佛陀被問及開明者的死后狀況時（例如，在M I.483-8），可能性被列為：（1）死后繼續(xù)存在，（2）死后不存在：（3）死后既存在又不存在：（4）死后既不存在也不存在。當佛陀拒絕（1）和（2）時，我們得到 "既不相同也不不同" 的重復。但是，當他繼續(xù)娛樂，然后拒絕，（3）和（4）邏輯上的困難是復雜的。由于每個（3）和（4）似乎在形式上是矛盾的，娛樂要么是娛樂的可能性，矛盾可能是真的。他們的否認似乎等于肯定被排斥的中間人，這顯然與否認（1）和（2）不相容。人們可能會懷疑，我們是否在這里的神秘的存在。

There were some Buddhist philosophers who took 'neither the same nor different’ in this way. These were the Personalists (Pudgalavādins), who were so called because they affirmed the ultimate existence of the person as something named and conceptualized in dependence on the psychophysical elements. They claimed that the person is neither identical with nor distinct from the psychophysical elements. They were prepared to accept, as a consequence, that nothing whatever can be said about the relation between person and elements. But their view was rejected by most Buddhist philosophers, in part on the grounds that it quickly leads to an ineffability paradox: one can say neither that the person’s relation to the elements is inexpressible, nor that it is not inexpressible. The consensus view was instead that the fact that the person can be said to be neither identical with nor distinct from the elements is grounds for taking the person to be a mere conceptual fiction. Concerning the persons in the two lives, they understood the negations involved in 'neither the same nor different’ to be of the commitmentless variety, i.e., to function like illocutionary negation. If we agree that the statement '7 is green’ is semantically ill-formed, on the grounds that abstract objects such as numbers do not have colors, then we might go on to say, 'Do not say that 7 is green, and do not say that it is not green either’. There is no contradiction here, since the illocutionary negation operator 'do not say’ generates no commitment to an alternative characterization.有一些佛教哲學家以這種方式"既不相同也不不同"。這些人是個人主義者（Pudgalavédins），他們之所以被稱為"個人主義者"，是因為他們肯定了這個人的最終存在，認為這種存在是一種在依賴心理物理元素時被命名和概念化的東西。他們聲稱這個人既不相同，也不與心理生理因素不同。因此，他們準備接受，關(guān)于人與要素之間的關(guān)系，什么也說不來。但他們的觀點遭到了大多數(shù)佛教哲學家的拒絕，部分原因是它很快導致了一個不可言喻的悖論：人們既不能說人與元素的關(guān)系是無法表達的，也不能說它不是無法表達的。相反，一致的看法是，可以說這個人既不相同，也不與元素不同，這是把這個人僅僅是概念小說的理由。關(guān)于這兩個生命中的人，他們理解"既不相同也不不同"所涉及的否定是無承諾的多樣性，即像斷章離合的否定一樣運作。如果我們同意"7是綠色"的說法在語義上是不合時宜的，理由是數(shù)字等抽象物體沒有顏色，那么我們可能會說，'不要說7是綠色，也不要說不是綠色'。這里沒有矛盾，因為斷斷面的否定操作員"不說"不會產(chǎn)生對替代性特征的承諾。

There is also evidence that claims of type (3) involve parameterization. For instance, the claim about the arhat would be that there is some respect in which they can be said to exist after death, and some other respect in which they can be said to no longer exist after death. Entertaining such a proposition does not require that one believe there might be true contradictions. And while claims of type (4) would seem to be logically equivalent to those of type (3) (regardless of whether or not they involve parameterization), the tradition treated this type as asserting that the subject is beyond all conceptualization. To reject the type (4) claim about the arhat is to close off one natural response to the rejections of the first three claims: that the status of the arhat after death transcends rational understanding. That the Buddha rejected all four possibilities concerning this and related questions is not evidence that he employed a deviant logic.還有證據(jù)表明，類型（3）的索賠涉及參數(shù)化。例如，關(guān)于arhat的主張是，在某種方面，可以說它們在死后存在，而另一些方面，可以說它們死后就不再存在。接受這樣的命題并不要求人們相信可能存在真正的矛盾。雖然類型（4）的索賠在邏輯上似乎與類型（3）的索賠相同（無論它們是否涉及參數(shù)化），但傳統(tǒng)將此類索賠視為斷言主題是超越一切概念化的。拒絕關(guān)于阿爾哈特的類型（4）索賠是結(jié)束對前三個索賠的拒絕的一種自然反應：死后阿哈特的地位超越了理性的理解。佛陀拒絕了所有四種可能性，這和相關(guān)問題并不能證明他使用了一種反常的邏輯。

The Buddha’s response to questions like those concerning the arhat is sometimes cited in defense of a different claim about his attitude toward rationality. This is the claim that the Buddha was essentially a pragmatist, someone who rejects philosophical theorizing for its own sake and employs philosophical rationality only to the extent that doing so can help solve the practical problem of eliminating suffering. The Buddha does seem to be embracing something like this attitude when he defends his refusal to answer questions like that about the arhat, or whether the series of lives has a beginning, or whether the living principle (jīva) is identical with the body. He calls all the possible views with respect to such questions distractions insofar as answering them would not lead to the cessation of the defilements and thus to the end of suffering. And in a famous simile (M I.429) he compares someone who insists that the Buddha answer these questions to someone who has been wounded by an arrow but will not have the wound treated until they are told who shot the arrow, what sort of wood the arrow is made of, and the like.佛陀對諸如有關(guān)阿爾哈特的問題的回答有時被引用來為自己對理性態(tài)度的不同說法辯護。這就是佛陀本質(zhì)上是一個實用主義者的說法，一個為了自身利益而拒絕哲學理論的人，只有在這樣做有助于解決消除苦難的實際問題的情況下，才運用哲學理性。佛陀似乎接受這種態(tài)度時，他捍衛(wèi)他拒絕回答這樣的問題，關(guān)于阿爾哈特，或系列的生命是否有一個開始，或活的原則（jīva）是否與身體相同。他呼吁所有可能的意見，關(guān)于這些問題分心，只要回答這些問題不會導致停止污穢，從而結(jié)束痛苦。在一個著名的比喻（M I.429）中，他比較了一個人誰堅持佛陀回答這些問題的人誰已經(jīng)受傷的箭，但不會有傷口治療，直到他們被告知誰射箭，什么樣的木材箭是由，等。

Passages such as these surely attest to the great importance the Buddha placed on sharing his insights to help others overcome suffering. But this is consistent with the belief that philosophical rationality may be used to answer questions that lack evident connection with pressing practical concerns. And on at least one occasion the Buddha does just this. Pressed to give his answers to the questions about the arhat and the like, the Buddha first rejects all the possibilities of the tetralemma, and defends his refusal on the grounds that such theories are not conducive to liberation from sa?sāra. But when his questioner shows signs of thereby losing confidence in the value of the Buddha’s teachings about the path to the cessation of suffering, the Buddha responds with the example of a fire that goes out after exhausting its fuel. If one were asked where this fire has gone, the Buddha points out, one could consistently deny that it has gone to the north, to the south, or in any other direction. This is so for the simple reason that the questions 'Has it gone to the north?’, 'Has it gone to the south?’, etc., all share the false presupposition that the fire continues to exist. Likewise the questions about the arhat and the like all share the false presupposition that there is such a thing as a person who might either continue to exist after death, cease to exist at death, etc. (Anālayo 2018, 41) The difficulty with these questions is not that they try to extend philosophical rationality beyond its legitimate domain, as the handmaiden of soteriologically useful practice. It is rather that they rest on a false presupposition—something that is disclosed through the employment of philosophical rationality.諸如此類的傳道無疑證明了佛陀對分享他的見解以幫助他人克服苦難的高度重視。但這與這樣一種信念是一致的，即哲學理性可以用來回答與緊迫的實際關(guān)切缺乏明顯聯(lián)系的問題。至少有一次佛陀會這么做。佛陀被迫回答有關(guān)阿爾哈特等人的問題，首先拒絕四重奏的所有可能性，并以這種理論不利于從sa?sāra中解放出為由為自己的拒絕辯護。但是，當他的提問者表現(xiàn)出對佛陀關(guān)于停止苦難之路的教導價值失去信心的跡象時，佛陀以耗盡燃料后熄火的例子作為回應。佛陀指出，如果有人被問及這場大火的去向，人們可以一直否認它已經(jīng)向北、向南或向任何其他方向移動。原因很簡單，"它往北走了嗎？"同樣，關(guān)于阿爾哈特等人的問題也有著錯誤的假設(shè)，即有這樣一種假設(shè)，即一個人在死后可能繼續(xù)存在，在死亡時就不再存在，等等（Anélayo 2018， 41）這些問題的難點不在于他們試圖將哲學理性擴展到其合法領(lǐng)域之外，作為社會學有益實踐的代言人。相反，他們建立在一個錯誤的前提上——這是通過哲學理性的用法來揭露的。

A different sort of challenge to the claim that the Buddha valued philosophical rationality for its own sake comes from the role played by authority in Buddhist soteriology. For instance, in the Buddhist tradition one sometimes encounters the claim that only enlightened persons such as the Buddha can know all the details of karmic causation. And to the extent that the moral rules are thought to be determined by the details of karmic causation, this might be taken to mean that our knowledge of the moral rules is dependent on the authority of the Buddha. Again, the subsequent development of Buddhist philosophy seems to have been constrained by the need to make theory compatible with certain key claims of the Buddha. For instance, one school developed an elaborate form of four-dimensionalism, not because of any deep dissatisfaction with presentism, but because they believed the non-existence of the past and the future to be incompatible with the Buddha’s alleged ability to cognize past and future events. And some modern scholars go so far as to wonder whether non-self functions as anything more than a sort of linguistic taboo against the use of words like 'I’ and 'self’ in the Buddhist tradition (Collins 1982: 183). The suggestion is that just as in some other religious traditions the views of the founder or the statements of scripture trump all other considerations, including any views arrived at through the free exercise of rational inquiry, so in Buddhism as well there can be at best only a highly constrained arena for the deployment of philosophical rationality.佛陀為了自身利益而重視哲學理性的說法，另一種挑戰(zhàn)來自于權(quán)威在佛教學中所扮演的角色。例如，在佛教傳統(tǒng)中，人們有時會遇到這樣的說法：只有佛陀等開明的人才能知道業(yè)力因果關(guān)系的所有細節(jié)。如果認為道德規(guī)則是由業(yè)力因果關(guān)系的細節(jié)決定的，這可能意味著我們對道德規(guī)則的了解取決于佛陀的權(quán)威。同樣，佛教哲學的后續(xù)發(fā)展似乎也受到了使理論與佛陀某些關(guān)鍵主張相容的需要的制約。例如，一所學校發(fā)展了一種精心設(shè)計的四維主義形式，不是因為對現(xiàn)在主義有任何深深的不滿，而是因為他們認為過去和未來的不存在與佛陀所謂的認識過去和未來事件的能力不相容。一些現(xiàn)代學者甚至懷疑，在佛教傳統(tǒng)中使用"我"和"自我"等詞語，非自我是否只不過是一種語言禁忌（科林斯1982年：183年）。建議是，正如在其他一些宗教傳統(tǒng)中，創(chuàng)始人的觀點或經(jīng)文的陳述勝過所有其他考慮，包括通過自由進行理性探究得出的任何觀點，因此在佛教中，充其量只能有一個高度受限的部署哲學理性的舞臺。

Now it could be that while this is true of the tradition that developed out of the Buddha’s teachings, the Buddha himself held the unfettered use of rationality in quite high esteem. This would seem to conflict with what he is represented as saying in response to the report that he arrived at his conclusions through reasoning and analysis alone: that such a report is libelous, since he possesses a number of superhuman cognitive powers (M I.68). But at least some scholars take this passage to be not the Buddha’s own words but an expression of later devotionalist concerns (Gombrich 2009: 164). Indeed one does find a spirited discussion within the tradition concerning the question whether the Buddha is omniscient, a discussion that may well reflect competition between Buddhism and those Brahmanical schools that posit an omniscient creator. And at least for the most part the Buddhist tradition is careful not to attribute to the Buddha the sort of omniscience usually ascribed to an all-perfect being: the actual cognition, at any one time, of all truths. Instead a Buddha is said to be omniscient only in the much weaker sense of always having the ability to cognize any individual fact relevant to the soteriological project, viz. the details of their own past lives, the workings of the karmic causal laws, and whether a given individual’s defilements have been extirpated. Moreover, these abilities are said to be ones that a Buddha acquires through a specific course of training, and thus ones that others may reasonably aspire to as well. The attitude of the later tradition seems to be that while one could discover the relevant facts on one’s own, it would be more reasonable to take advantage of the fact that the Buddha has already done all the epistemic labor involved. When we arrive in a new town we could always find our final destination through trial and error, but it would make more sense to ask someone who already knows their way about.現(xiàn)在可能是，雖然這是從佛陀的教導中發(fā)展起來的傳統(tǒng)，但佛陀本人卻非常崇高地對理性的無拘無束地使用。這似乎與他代表在回應報告時所說的相沖突，即他僅僅通過推理和分析得出了結(jié)論：這樣的報告是誹謗性的，因為他擁有一些超人的認知能力（M I.68）。但至少一些學者認為這段話不是佛陀自己的話，而是后來虔誠主義擔憂的表達（《貢布里希2009：164》）。事實上，人們確實在傳統(tǒng)中發(fā)現(xiàn)了一個關(guān)于佛陀是否無所不知的問題的激烈討論，這種討論很可能反映了佛教和那些假定無所不知的創(chuàng)造者的婆羅門學派之間的競爭。至少在大多數(shù)情況下，佛教傳統(tǒng)是小心翼翼的，不要把那種無所不知的通常歸因于一個完美存在：在任何時候，所有真理的實際認知。相反，據(jù)說佛陀是無所不知的，只是在弱得多的意義上，總是有能力認識任何與軀體學項目相關(guān)的個人事實，即他們過去生活的細節(jié)，業(yè)力因果法的運作，以及某一個人的污穢是否被消滅。此外，這些能力據(jù)說是佛陀通過特定的訓練過程獲得的，因此其他人也可以合理地渴望這些能力。后來傳統(tǒng)的態(tài)度似乎是，雖然一個人可以自己發(fā)現(xiàn)相關(guān)的事實，但利用佛陀已經(jīng)做了所有涉及的顯性勞動這一事實會更合理。當我們到達一個新的城鎮(zhèn)，我們總是可以通過反復試驗找到我們的最終目的地，但它會更有意義地問的人誰已經(jīng)知道他們的方式。

The Buddhist philosophical tradition grew out of earlier efforts to systematize the Buddha’s teachings. Within a century or two of the death of the Buddha, exegetical differences led to debates concerning the Buddha’s true intention on some matter, such as that between the Personalists and others over the status of the person. While the parties to these debates use many of the standard tools and techniques of philosophy, they were still circumscribed by the assumption that the Buddha’s views on the matter at hand are authoritative. In time, however, the discussion widened to include interlocutors representing various Brahmanical systems. Since the latter did not take the Buddha’s word as authoritative, Buddhist thinkers were required to defend their positions in other ways. The resulting debate (which continued for about nine centuries) touched on most of the topics now considered standard in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of language, and was characterized by considerable sophistication in philosophical methodology. What the Buddha would have thought of these developments we cannot say with any certainty. What we can say is that many Buddhists have believed that the unfettered exercise of philosophical rationality is quite consistent with his teachings.佛教哲學傳統(tǒng)源于早期將佛陀的教義系統(tǒng)化的努力。在佛陀去世的一兩個世紀內(nèi)，外在的分歧導致了關(guān)于佛陀在某些問題上的真實意圖的爭論，例如個人主義者和其他人之間關(guān)于人的地位的爭論。雖然這些辯論的各方使用了許多標準的哲學工具和技術(shù)，但他們?nèi)匀槐环鹜訉κ诸^問題的看法具有權(quán)威性的假設(shè)所限制。然而，隨著時間的推移，討論范圍擴大，包括代表各種婆羅門制度的對話者。由于后者沒有把佛陀的話作為權(quán)威，佛教思想家被要求以其他方式捍衛(wèi)他們的立場。由此產(chǎn)生的辯論（持續(xù)了大約九個世紀）觸及了現(xiàn)在被認為是形而上學、認識論和語言哲學標準的大多數(shù)主題，其特點是哲學方法相當復雜。佛陀會怎么看這些事態(tài)發(fā)展，我們不能肯定地說。我們可以說的是，許多佛教徒認為，自由行使哲學理性與他的教導是完全一致的。

Bibliography Primary Sources書目主要來源

[A]

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[D]

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[M]

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[S]

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